

FIELD EVALUATION OF LOCAL INTEGRATION OF FORMER REFUGEES IN TANZANIA

FIELD VISIT REPORT - FINAL

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**Evaluating the Effectiveness of Humanitarian Engagement and Programming in Promoting
Local Integration of Refugees in Zambia, Tanzania, and Cameroon**

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Programming in Promoting Local Integration of Refugees in
Zambia, Tanzania, and Cameroon

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYM LIST	ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	iii
I. INTRODUCTION	iii
II. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS	iii
III. RECOMMENDATIONS	iv
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION	1
A. SCOPE OF WORK	1
B. METHODOLOGY	1
CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND	3
A. LOCAL INTEGRATION AS A DURABLE SOLUTION	3
B. DEFINING AND MEASURING LOCAL INTEGRATION	3
C. BACKGROUND ON LOCAL INTEGRATION EFFORTS	4
D. OVERVIEW OF BURUNDIANS IN TANZANIA	5
CHAPTER III: EVALUATION OF LOCAL INTEGRATION IN TANZANIA	8
A. SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES TO DATE	8
Self-Reliance.....	8
Feeling at Home	11
Equality Between Former Refugees and Host Communities	13
Host Government and Host Community Welcoming	16
Diplomatic and Programmatic Interventions	20
B. FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES	22
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	24
A. CONCLUSIONS	24
B. RECOMMENDATIONS	25
ATTACHMENT A: List of People Interviewed	28
ATTACHMENT B: List of Documents Consulted	31
ATTACHMENT C: Community-Driven Reconstruction	32

ACRONYM LIST

dTS	Development and Training Services, Inc.
GOT	Government of the United Republic of Tanzania
IRC	International Rescue Committee
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
NaSCIP	National Strategy for Community Integration Programme
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NNT	Newly Naturalized Tanzanian
PMO-RALG	Prime Minister's Office, Regional Administration Local Government
PRM	U.S. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
TANCOSS	Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy
TCRS	Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. INTRODUCTION

A two-person team funded by the U.S. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) traveled to Tanzania from May 26 to June 13, 2014 to conduct a field evaluation of the local integration of former Burundian refugees. The team interviewed 221 former Burundian refugees from the 1972 caseload, including a mix of men and women across all age groups who live in government settlements or who spontaneously settled in communities within the Kigoma region where there are no government settlements. The team also interviewed Tanzanians in the host communities and officials from the Government of the Republic of Tanzania (GOT), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), partner governments, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

II. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The GOT was initially very welcoming and helpful to Burundian refugees that fled to Tanzania starting in 1972. Its openness and generosity enabled them to realize a relatively high level of social and economic integration; the GOT provided land and access to services to the 1972 Burundians, which allowed the refugees to achieve self-reliance and a standard of living similar to that of Tanzanians living in the surrounding area. The host communities' welcoming attitude also allowed the 1972 Burundians to integrate socially and feel that Tanzania is their home, as well as a place where they could enjoy peace and security.

The GOT attempted to legally integrate the 1972 Burundians when it offered to naturalize all those who chose not to repatriate. Having naturalized more than 162,000 former Burundian refugees in 2010, the GOT was lauded internationally for this unprecedented move.

Shortly after they received verbal notification of their naturalization, the Newly Naturalized Tanzanians (NNTs) were told they would have to relocate to another part of Tanzania before they could receive their certificate of citizenship. A year later, the relocation plan was put on hold when it was concluded that the GOT did not have the support of the regions that were to host the former Burundian refugees.

Where there was once hope that they would be legally integrated, there is now frustration, disappointment, and confusion amongst NNTs regarding their legal status. In the process of being naturalized, they denounced their Burundian citizenship, so they are no longer Burundians. And because they are naturalized Tanzanians, they are no longer refugees. However, because they are not allowed to practice their rights as naturalized citizens, they are not yet treated as legal Tanzanians. This has left them confused about their identity and uncertain about their future. At this point, they still feel that UNHCR and GOT will make things right, but the level of frustration will increase over time.

NNTs have also experienced economic setbacks. When they were informed about the relocation plans, they were told not to build permanent structures or plant long-term crops, so their sense of security and their productivity decreased. At the same time, the level of services decreased, because district officials were told to limit investments, as the settlements were to close when the 1972 Burundians relocated to other parts of Tanzania. This decrease in public services included closing secondary schools in the settlements.

The relocation issue is still unresolved, with no obvious conclusion in the near future. With campaigning already underway for the 2015 presidential election, the attention of elected officials is diverted and this is not a priority for them. The issue also has the potential to be controversial, further reducing the political will to resolve it once and for all.

Given that the 1972 Burundians are not a priority for the GOT at this time, it is the responsibility of UNHCR and partner governments to pressure the GOT to address the issue. Absent external pressure, resolution will most likely be delayed through the election. There is a real risk that if the issue is not resolved before the current president – the one who made the commitment to naturalize these refugees – leaves office in 2015, the new president may not take ownership. A six-month delay may lead to an indefinite one as a result of the elections, and the 1972 Burundians will continue living in limbo without practicing or accessing their rights as Tanzanian citizens (or Burundian citizens), or having the assistance and protection that refugees normally receive.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

While there are some programmatic recommendations, the overarching issue is citizenship. If this issue is not resolved, programmatic efforts will not succeed, either. Following are programmatic and diplomatic recommendations for both the USG and UNHCR.

Programmatic Interventions

1. UNHCR and partner governments should fund NGOs to provide village-based credit programs, agricultural training, community health education, water well maintenance, etc.
2. The GOT and NGOs should facilitate community-driven reconstruction within the villages. The GOT and UNHCR should consider how to approach the challenges of governance in the settlements, given that refugees have come to rely on UNHCR since their return in 2007. There must be a clear transition away from UNHCR. The population must not look to UNHCR for protection or services but rather to the GOT, civil society organizations, and/or traditional leadership. It is worth considering the community-driven development approach that was pioneered by the World Bank, USAID, and others, and subsequently adapted by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) for post-conflict situations (see Attachment C for IRC's manual on community-driven reconstruction).
3. UNHCR, in collaboration with the GOT and national NGOs, should provide civic education for both new and old Tanzanian citizens so they understand their rights and responsibilities.
4. NGOs should offer legal aid related to land issues, birth certificates, and social services.

Diplomatic Interventions

1. UNHCR and partner governments should increase pressure on the president of Tanzania and other relevant parts of the GOT to resolve the relocation issue before the 2015 presidential elections. This should include the following:
 - a. Highlight how the status quo is hindering the progress of the 1972 Burundians, as well as development of the regions where the settlements are located.
 - b. Build and maintain a sense of urgency. If this is not resolved before a new president is elected, the issue may remain unresolved indefinitely, which denies the 1972 Burundians the ability to exercise their rights as citizens of Tanzania. This also puts a “black mark” on an initiative for which the GOT was so recently widely applauded.
 - c. Follow up with the president, prime minister, and parliament on every GOT event, speech, or news article that mentions the issue.
 - d. Orient new officials from the GOT and international community to help make this a priority issue and to minimize the chances that it will drop off their agendas.
 - e. Stay focused amid competing priorities like the presidential elections, current review of the constitution, etc. There are opportunities to keep the Burundian caseload in focus as the GOT reviews the immigration and refugee rights components of the constitution.
2. Promote a solution that includes the following components:
 - a. Grant citizenship certificates without the requirement to relocate.
 - b. Support voluntary relocation – in terms of when and where 1972 Burundians will relocate – to reduce pressure on the regions that currently host the former refugees. This should include both policy and financial support.
 - c. Classify the settlement villages as regular villages in the districts.
 - d. Encourage native Tanzanians to move to the settlement areas to increase social integration and reduce concern about an enclave forming. This may require an incentive, such as offering a plot of land for cultivating along with agricultural inputs.
 - e. Allow NNTs to practice their full rights as citizens, including, but not limited to, freedom of movement, the right to work, access to credit, membership in cooperatives, greater access to secondary schools and universities, and the right to vote.
 - f. Solicit financial support from development donors for relocation purposes and to help districts that host more new citizens than they can reasonably absorb. It is advisable that the GOT conduct a survey in collaboration with UNHCR to understand the possible impact on various regions and districts.
3. Urge the GOT to initiate the naturalization process for Burundians who spontaneously settled in the Kigoma region.
4. Encourage the GOT to allow district governments to fund development activities in the settlements on par with other administrative units in their districts.

A number of lessons learned in Tanzania can benefit other countries considering local integration. Toward this end, further recommendations based on lessons are outlined in this report.

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

A. SCOPE OF WORK

The purpose of the field-based evaluation in Tanzania was to assist in determining the success of the U.S. Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and UNHCR's programming and engagement and to recommend what PRM should be doing to support local integration. Findings from this field visit supplement those from an earlier desk review, and will be complemented by field visits to Cameroon and Zambia.

The full study, consisting of the desk study and three field visits, focuses on three key questions:

1. To what extent has the programming and engagement of PRM and UNHCR promoted local integration?
2. What programmatic and diplomatic interventions, as identified by PRM and UNHCR, were most and least successful?
3. What should PRM and its partners be doing to support the self-reliance of refugee populations for whom voluntary return and resettlement are not feasible?

A number of other questions are included in the contract's Statement of Work, including these specific questions about Tanzania:

1. What have been the barriers to making progress?
2. What more should be done programmatically and diplomatically to address these barriers?
3. How has the ambiguity over the government's naturalization strategy affected local integration?

This report first reviews the successes and challenges to date with the local integration program, then presents future opportunities and challenges. Findings are presented first; the report ends with the team's conclusions and recommendations.

B. METHODOLOGY

Over the three-week period in Tanzania, the evaluation team conducted a series of interviews, made observations, and reviewed documentation. The evaluation included interviews with key informants in Dar es Salaam and the regions of Katavi, Tabora, and Kigoma; focus groups and individual interviews with former Burundian refugees in the "Old Settlements" of Katumba, Mishamo, and Ilyankulu; interviews with Burundian families who spontaneously settled in the Kigoma region; and focus groups with Tanzanians living in the settlements.

The interviews consisted of semi-structured focus groups and structured, in-depth individual interviews as follows:

Interview Type	Gender	Age Group	Government Settlement vs Self-Settled
Focus Group – Burundians	106 Males 53% 95 Females 47%	<18 4% 18-29 24% 30-50 35% >50 37%	GS 97% SS 3%
In-depth One-on-One – Burundians	13 Males 65% 7 Females 35%	<18 0% 18-29 15% 30-50 45% >50 40%	GS 60% SS 40%
Focus Groups – Tanzanian Host Community	33 Males 75% 11 Females 25%	<18 0% 18-29 12% 30-50 45% >50 43%	n/a
TOTAL	152 Males 57% 113 Females 43% 265 TOTAL	<18 3% 18-29 21% 30-50 38% >50 38%	GS 77% SS 33%

The evaluation team aimed to balance males and females, engage all age groups, and include both those living in government settlement and those who spontaneously settled elsewhere. The gender and age balance was much better with the focus groups, but one-on-one interviews were more balanced in terms of government settled compared to spontaneously-settled.

The team also interviewed 70 officials from the GOT at the national, regional, and district levels, as well as officials from UNHCR, partner governments including the United States, and NGOs. While UNHCR carefully coordinated appointments with GOT officials, a majority were not available when the team arrived for the interviews. In some cases, other individuals had been appointed to meet with the team.

CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND

A. LOCAL INTEGRATION AS A DURABLE SOLUTION

Naturalization of a refugee in the country of refuge is a key principle in the refugee convention, as stated in Article 34, “The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings” ([UNHCR Website: 1951 Convention and Protocol](#)). This fundamental principle is again mandated in the Statue that governs UNHCR, where UNHCR is required not only to protect refugees, but must also seek “durable solutions” for refugees. The three durable solutions are: (1) repatriation, where a refugee returns to his/her country of origin; (2) resettlement, where a third country (not the country of refuge) offers to settle and provide the necessary steps to full citizenship to the refugee; and (3) naturalization (or local integration, the more common term), where the country of refuge allows refugees to permanently settle there and is expected to offer necessary steps to citizenship and/or permanent residency status as a durable solution ([UNHCR Website: Durable Solutions](#)).

Most refugees, no matter how long or short their length of refugee status, voluntarily repatriate. In the case of Tanzania, over 418,000 Burundian refugees have returned home since 2002, either through facilitated or promoted repatriation efforts. Another 34,000 refugees from the 1993 caseload left through an “orderly return” to Burundi when the Mtabila camp closed in December 2012.

Typically, a much smaller number are resettled to a third country. This holds true for Burundians in Tanzania; since 2006, only around 12,000 Burundians have been resettled, mostly to the United States.

While local integration is not always a durable solution available to refugees, the GOT offered it to more than 162,000 of its 1972 Burundian caseload – referred to as the “1972 Burundians” – in 2009 and 2010 as part of the Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy. While it was unprecedented to grant naturalization to such a large number of refugees, these Newly Naturalized Tanzanians (NNT) have yet to receive their citizenship documentation or benefit from their new rights. This issue has been unresolved since August 2011, and will be discussed in greater detail below.

B. DEFINING AND MEASURING LOCAL INTEGRATION

Local integration must be defined in order to explore its practices. There are a plethora of definitions, but no universal one. The UN Refugee convention does not provide a legal definition of local integration, except that Article 34 clearly states that it should include naturalization – and thus, steps to full citizenship. Literature indicates that local integration is most commonly defined as a process involving three broad categories: economic, social, and legal integration, where a refugee achieves certain minimum standards within the host country’s social, economic, and legal frameworks ([UNHCR Website: 1951 Convention and Protocol](#)).

Economic integration is the process whereby refugees can participate in the job or self-employment market (including farming), commensurate with their skills, and/or they obtain a standard of self-sufficiency or standard of living that is similar to the host country population. Examples of key economic factors that lead to self-sufficiency are access to land for at least subsistence farming and/or cash crops, access to local markets to sell goods, access to daily worker or casual labor markets, access to credit, livelihood training, and access to professional licenses and/or work permits ([Kuhlman, Aug 1993:3](#)).


Social integration is a reciprocal process where the host community and state accept a refugee into their community without fear of discrimination, intimidation, or repression, and the refugee is able to create and maintain social bonds and links within the host community ([Crisp, 2004:1-2](#)). Given this definition, key social indicators are: refugee participation in shared ethnic and/or religious traditions with the host community, inter-marriages, participation in national celebrations, creating relationships with members of other communities, shared linguistic skills, and civil society participation in local and central government and non-government services ([Ager & Strang, 2004:3-4](#)).

Legal integration is best defined as a process “...whereby refugees are granted a progressively wider range of rights and entitlements by the host state...The process whereby refugees gain and accumulate rights may lead to the acquisition of permanent residence rights and ultimately to the acquisition of citizenship in the country of asylum” ([Crisp, 2004:1-2](#)). Indicators of legal integration are freedom of movement, travel documents (such as a passport), residential permits, work permits, and the ultimate final step of official citizenship or permanent residency.

The processes of economic, social, and legal integration are interdependent. The three processes can also be catalysts for further integration. For example, a refugee who is employed within the host community will, by default, increase social links and knowledge of the community. If a refugee has access to health and education services, it also serves as a greater social and cultural catalyst through the exposure and contact the refugee has within a host community. Certain elements of legal integration, such as freedom of movement, increase the ability of a refugee to access to markets, thus increasing the chances of economic integration and self-sufficiency. One of the most important indicators of local integration that encompasses all integration processes is safety and security. A refugee must feel safe and secure in order to even begin to locally integrate. If harassment, discrimination, violent, and/or criminal acts are a constant threat to a refugee, his or her ability to integrate economically, socially, and/or legally will be severely constrained ([Kuhlman, Aug 1993:3](#)).

C. BACKGROUND ON LOCAL INTEGRATION EFFORTS

The economic and social integration of Burundian refugees has been occurring since their arrival in Tanzania starting in 1972. Legal integration, however, did not start in earnest until 2007, when the GOT indicated an interest in securing a permanent solution and to close the three “Old Settlements” of Ilyankulu, Katumba, and Mishamo. Although UNHCR had withdrawn in 1985 when the GOT took over management of the refugee settlements, UNHCR was invited back in 2007 to help facilitate implementation of a permanent solution.



In 2007 and 2008, a census and study on registration were conducted, forming the basis of the Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy (TANCOSS). The strategy outlined three pillars: (1) voluntary repatriation for those who preferred to return to Burundi (despite the lack of a cessation clause being invoked); (2) naturalization for those who preferred to stay in Tanzania; and (3) final integration of those naturalized.

Between 2008 and 2010, more than 53,600 refugees returned to Burundi to complete Pillar 1 and 162,256 were naturalized to complete Pillar 2. In addition to the newly naturalized, the settlements include nearly 9,000 refugees who either had not completed the naturalization process or who were initially rejected. An estimated 28,000 children born between 2010 and 2014 are still pending naturalization. The process has, likewise, yet to begin for the 22,227 Burundians who spontaneously settled in the Kigoma region as early as 1972.

After notifications of naturalization were made in April 2010, the GOT launched Pillar 3. Announcement of the National Strategy for Community Integration Program (NaSCIP) in June revealed that the NNTs were to be relocated to 16 regions across Tanzania. Only upon relocation were they to receive their citizenship certificates, despite the fact that relocation is not normally a requirement for citizenship in Tanzania. Only 749 individuals living in the Dar es Salaam area have received citizenship certificates.

Resistance from officials in the regions that were to host the new citizens caused the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) relocation efforts to be put on hold in August 2011. The issues remain unresolved as of June 2014, leaving the 1972 Burundian caseload in limbo.

D. OVERVIEW OF BURUNDIANS IN TANZANIA

The table below shows the number of Burundians by status. The majority of current and former Burundian refugees in Tanzania live in the three Old Settlements. The others live in the Kigoma region, either as self-settled or encamped refugees.

Those who reside in the Old Settlements arrived in Tanzania in 1972 and are referred to as the “1972 Burundians.” Most of this population has been in Tanzania for approximately 42 years and has been naturalized. Given the long span of time since their arrival, several generations of children have been born who have

never been to Burundi. According to a 2007 census, 80 percent of the “Burundians” were born in Tanzania.

	Registered Refugees	Naturalized	Total
Katumba settlement in Katavi region	3,775	62,641	66,416
Mishamo settlement in Katavi region	2,783	52,597	55,380
Ilyankulu settlement in Tabora	2,281	47,018	49,299
Self-settled in Kigoma Region	22,227	n/a	22,227
Nyarugusu Camp & Transit Facility	3,980	n/a	3,980
Total	35,046	162,253	197,302*

*Does not include children born in settlements since the last UNHCR census. For example, GOT census reports for 2012 show that Mishamo now has a population of 95,500 refugees.

Source: UNHCR Operation Fact Sheet, April 2014

There is considerable confusion among the settlement population, government officials, and the international community about how to classify this population. They are given a variety of labels, including:

- “1972 Burundians,” or “1972 caseload,” because they arrived from Burundi in 1972
- Former Burundian refugees because they are naturalized and no longer refugees, although the GOT’s Immigration Department still labels them as such
- “Former Burundians in Transition to Citizenship,” because they denounced their Burundian citizenship but have yet to enjoy their rights as citizens of Tanzania
- “Tanzanians,” or “Newly Naturalized Tanzanians” (NNT), because they were naturalized in 2010 and, according to Tanzania’s president and attorney general, are now considered citizens, despite opinions to the contrary, and despite the fact that they cannot access their citizenship rights

This report uses all these labels interchangeably.

Settlements are located in the western part of Tanzania and are among the largest in Africa. Ilyankulu, for example, covers approximately 1,000 square kilometers, which is roughly the size of Zanzibar or Luxemburg. This distance and extremely poor road conditions mean it can take several hours to cross from one side of a settlement to the other.

The population in each settlement, as indicated in the table above, comprises a significant portion of its respective region. Tanzanians also live in villages within the settlements, because they either were there before the settlements were established, or later moved there.

For the most part, Burundian refugees in the Nyarugusu camp are not 1972 Burundians but, rather, from the 1993 caseload, as well as nearly 60,000 refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo. In May 2011, the GOT called for a review of the 1993 caseload in the Mtabila camp, with the intent of closing the camp by December 2011 (later extended to December 2012). It was determined that some 2,700 Burundian refugees still needed international protection; they were relocated to Nyarugusu, where they remain today with the hope of being resettled. For the rest of the refugees in Mtabila, “the Government of Tanzania declared cessation of refugee status for these individuals, issuing written cessation decisions to those affected” ([UNHCR 2012 Information Note](#)).

The settlements have been managed by the MHA since the mid-1980s and receive support, to varying degrees, from the relevant district councils and police. Each settlement has a “settlement commandant” who oversees GOT services and is authorized to issue exit permits for refugees to leave the settlement for a designated period of time, usually not to exceed 14 days.

UNHCR was in the settlements until 1985, and was invited back in 2007 to help implement TANCOS and provide capacity support on legal and administrative issues. UNCHR also funded 45 small and medium-scale community-based projects related to education, health, and water. While these projects have benefited settlement residents and Tanzanians in the surrounding communities, UNHCR presence is confusing to residents – they look to the organization for development aid and basic support, but that is not its primary role.

CHAPTER III: EVALUATION OF LOCAL INTEGRATION IN TANZANIA

A. SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES TO DATE

The team found that the Burundians are *de facto* integrated after more than 40 years in Tanzania. Most of the 1972 caseload has now been naturalized and is awaiting final integration.

The successes and challenges of various factors of economic, social, and legal integration are explored below, based on findings from interviews of more than 250 Burundians in Tanzania, as well as members of the host communities, GOT officials, UNHCR, and other key informants.

Self-Reliance

The 1972 Burundians in the settlements became economically integrated and self-sufficient within about a dozen years after arriving. UNHCR initially provided assistance – including food, shelter, and social services – that ended in 1985. The GOT granted each household five hectares of land for cultivation. While the former refugees no longer rely on external assistance, their self-reliance is based primarily on subsistence farming, and most live a hand-to-mouth existence. Some have gone beyond subsistence farming, having engaged in tobacco farming as a significant cash crop. Others have established livelihoods through small animal husbandry or such work as brickmaking, carpentry, or tailoring.

"Life is good here, we do not depend on outside assistance, we do our work and we depend on our farms."
– 1972 Burundian

The economic condition in the settlements has deteriorated over the past few years. Shortly after the vast majority of the settlement population was informed about their naturalization in 2010, they learned of the plan to relocate them to other regions in Tanzania. It was suggested that they factor the relocation plan into their decisions about what to plant and what type of housing to construct. This led to a decline in productivity and increased their sense of insecurity. Government officials have also, unfortunately, been reluctant to make investments in social services in the settlements, causing a subsequent decline in education (including closing at least two secondary schools) and health care. Similarly, the fact that most of the 1972 Burundians are no longer considered refugees has affected UNHCR's presence and interventions there. UNHCR still considers them "persons of concern," even though they are naturalized Tanzanians. The 1972 Burundians continue in limbo while waiting for a resolution of the relocation issue and access to their rights as citizens.

Burundians who spontaneously settled, predominantly in the Kigoma Region, have never benefited from UN assistance. These refugees have been providing for themselves via host communities that generously shared their land. Agricultural work and casual labor efforts have been their primary

method of survival, similar to refugees in settlements, as well as Tanzanians in the surrounding areas.

Key to the economic integration of the 1972 Burundians has been their access to land and ability to grow crops to feed their families and eliminate the need for external assistance. In a few cases, they have also had access to modern farming equipment, fertilizer, credit, training, and formal employment, but these are generally not accessible.

While the 1972 Burundians are self-reliant, they struggle economically. Their economic situation parallels their impoverished Tanzanian counterparts in the same area: they are generally subsistence farmers, some produce cash crops, and they often do not have enough food to feed their families or cash to pay school or clinic fees. The former refugees differ from native Tanzanians in that they do not have full freedom of movement, require permits to legally work in the formal job sector, and do not have full access to fertilizer or credit. These have affected their ability to access markets, acquire modern farm equipment, and take advantage of training opportunities. Had that access been less limited, more of the 1972 Burundians would have been in a better position to produce cash crops, access markets, and obtain jobs that would have allowed them to move beyond their current level of poverty.

It should also be noted that their ability to feed their families varies from season to season and from year to year. Families are able to eat two to three meals a day following the harvest, but in the midst of the growing season, they may only have one meal a day while they wait for the next harvest. Years in which there has been little rainfall also means fewer meals for the family.

Access to Land. As the GOT generously welcomed the Burundians to settlements in Tanzania in 1972, they gave them land to cultivate, anticipating that it would help the refugees become self-sufficient. It is believed that each household was given five hectares of land, but not many of the original heads of household are still available to verify this, and others do not have precise measurements of their land. Verifying the size of plots is also complicated by the fact that since the original distribution, some people were given plots by their parents, some acquired land informally when plots were vacated by those who repatriated, and some have simply taken it upon themselves to cultivate available land. Those who spontaneously settled were either given land from the village council or bought it from Tanzanians in the village. In other cases, former Burundians rent the land for cash or other forms of payment. The evaluation team found no individuals who had documentation regarding the land they consider theirs.

While, in some cases, the amount of land for each household has expanded, in other cases it has decreased. The original plots given to those who are now grandparents has been divided and shared among their children, then divided and shared again with their grandchildren. The original plots may have been large enough to feed the families who farmed them, but they cannot support the extended family. The evaluation team interviewed one family who is sharing their parents' land with 11 siblings, their 8 children, and dozens of nieces and nephews.

Another challenge is that people have been cultivating the same plots with the same crops for 42 years. This has greatly reduced the fertility of the land. In addition to increasingly smaller plots

per person, the land is also becoming less productive – this means that families are struggling more and more to feed their children.

There was little evidence that farmers practice methods to maintain soil fertility, including the use of natural or chemical fertilizers. They realize that chemical fertilizers would make their land more productive, but few can access them. Fertilizer is available in the local markets, but is very expensive. To obtain the subsidized price, a farmer must belong to one of the agricultural cooperatives that are currently only open to citizens. In one settlement, membership in the cooperatives seems to be less restrictive, and in another settlement, tobacco farmers can obtain fertilizer through the companies that buy their crops.

Agricultural productivity is also affected by the tools that are available. Hand hoes are still the standard tool, because few can afford modern farming equipment. It would be difficult to fuel and maintain such equipment, or move it along the poor-quality settlement roads.

The primary crops cultivated in the settlements are cassava, maize, sweet potatoes, beans, and ground nuts. While these are grown mostly for consumption by the growers, the settlements produce a significant portion of the food supply for their respective districts, especially in terms of cassava. Farmers in the Mishamo settlement are thought to grow 50 percent of the region's food and 57 percent of the region's tobacco; there is also significant production of tobacco in the Katumba settlement.

Access to Credit. Access to credit has the potential to strengthen self-reliance as farmers purchase greater quantities and varieties of seed, fertilizer, and, ultimately, modern farming equipment and means to transport crops to markets. Through credit, one can also pay for advanced education and training or start businesses. Unfortunately, very few of the 1972 Burundians interviewed reported having borrowed money.

While some of the 1972 Burundians expressed interest in borrowing money to pay for school fees, fertilizer, or more land, they fear they would not have the resources to pay back a loan. Their access to credit is also limited because they are not yet considered citizens, so cannot approach banks or cooperatives for loans. In one settlement, however, they have been allowed to borrow money and have successfully repaid the loans.

Once the 1972 Burundians are given their full rights as citizens of Tanzania, they will be able to obtain credit through cooperatives and banks.

Access to Employment and Other Forms of Livelihoods. Like credit, jobs in the formal sector would enhance self-reliance. Full-time, permanent work for cash wages, however, is extremely uncommon among Burundians in Tanzania. Although it is possible for them to obtain work permits, the procedure is not well known, and Burundians believe they must show a Tanzanian birth certificate – which they do not have – to a potential employer. Only a few have been able to secure jobs as teachers, and even those positions have become complicated since 2010, when they were naturalized and their status changed. Once on permanent contracts, but they are now on temporary contracts with no benefits.

Once citizenship is secured, the former Burundian refugees will no longer be required to obtain work permits. In the meantime, their livelihoods will be based primarily on agriculture – either working on their own land or for other farmers – and such things as carpentry, masonry, mechanics, and tailoring. In Ilyankulu where freedom of movement is less restricted, some go outside the settlement for casual labor.

Skills Training. District officials reported that they provide agricultural extension services, including training, to those in the settlements. There was little evidence of this among those interviewed, however, and most refugees said that they had never heard of such a thing. Only one person interviewed said he had received training from the extension workers, but claimed it was not effective.

None of the individuals interviewed could recall having received training from UNHCR, donor governments, or NGOs. A technical school is available in the Ilyankulu settlement, but no one the team interviewed had attended it. Katumba had a training center, but it closed three years ago because it did not meet standards. Tobacco companies provide tobacco-specific training to their supplier farmers.

Feeling at Home

Among the Burundians interviewed for this evaluation, there was an overwhelming consensus that Tanzania feels like home. The first arrivals have been in the country for over 40 years, and the rest (estimated at over 80 percent) were born in Tanzania. They have established homes, gone through the Tanzanian education system, and raised children and grandchildren in Tanzania. They socialize with Tanzanians, celebrate with them, and marry them. While the former Burundians have maintained their mother tongue, they have learned to communicate with Tanzanians in Kiswahili.

Those who remained in Tanzania after the extensive repatriation efforts feel completely at home, and have no interest in returning to Burundi. This holds true for those who spontaneously settled. Given the length of time away from Burundi, they have nothing to go “home” to, and a vast majority has *never* been to Burundi.

When asked what former refugees do not like about being in Tanzania, they indicated time and time again that they have no problems in Tanzania and they are grateful to be there. The most common idea was *amani*, which means “peace” in Kiswahili. The question that followed was about their feelings regarding the possibility of obtaining citizenship certificates. They almost always squealed in delight or clapped and said things like:

- “We’d know our mother Tanzania loves us!”
- “I’d feel comfortable and free.”
- “We’d feel like we had money in our pockets!”
- “I’d be so happy I’d climb a tree!”

The conversation took on a different tone when asked if they think of themselves as Burundians, Tanzanians, or refugees. One group laughed at the question. Several shrugged their shoulders and said they did not know. A majority who answered said they consider themselves Tanzanians, and a large number consider themselves refugees, but none described themselves as Burundians. Some preferred to identify themselves as Hutu. Their responses also included some uncertainty, like:

"We want to stay here, this IS our home; we identify ourselves as Tanzanians and nothing else."

– 1972 Burundian

- “We are like bats, neither animal nor bird.”
- “I don’t know. You tell me.”
- “I was born in Tanzania, but I am not yet a citizen of Tanzania.”
- “Only God knows!”
- “I feel like a Tanzanian, but I don’t have any document to prove that’s what I am.”
- “The most important thing is to get rid of our refugee status.”

Safety and Security. Refugees generally feel safe in Tanzania, both inside and outside the settlements. Although there are incidences of gender-based violence, women and children feel and are generally safe. The crime rate is low and similar to Tanzanian villages, with petty theft, domestic violence, and a few murders. When a crime has been committed, refugees understand the need to report the crime to either the village chief or the police. Unfortunately, there are not many police in the settlements, so one must travel a great distance to reach their offices. The police are largely trusted by the refugees, but some believe the police are corrupt and will ask for money, saying it is for gas so they can follow up on the crime. The evaluation team was unable to verify whether these suspicions are true.

The perception of safety is much different among government officials. Their sense is that the refugees are responsible for poaching, banditry, and bringing weapons from Burundi. There were no data or concrete evidence that refugees were involved in such crimes. Some believe these crimes may have been committed by refugees from the 1993 caseload, but that the 1972 Burundians are peaceful and law-abiding. When pushed on this question, government officials could only report such crimes based on rumors. One government official recounted a case of banditry in which three people were caught. As the story progressed, it was revealed that only one of the criminals caught was from Burundi – the other two were from Tanzania. Other reports were based only on hearsay, and it became evident that refugees are often the first to be blamed.

Housing. Another indication that the refugees have been integrated is that the size and construction of their houses is similar to Tanzanian homes in the same area. They are constructed with mud brick, with either thatched or corrugated metal roofing. They build their own houses, which are similar to their houses in Burundi, and pay no rent to live there.

"We take care of them when things are bad and celebrate with them when things are good. They do the same for us."

- Tanzanian referring to refugees

Social Connections. Perhaps the best indicator of social integration is the extent to which refugees socialize with the local population. In the case of this refugee population, there appear to be no barriers between the refugees and native Tanzanians. The two groups socialize at all levels, including at school, church, and community activities. In fact, the refugees

commonly celebrate Tanzania holidays, but may not know much about Burundian national holidays. The level of their interaction extends to marriage. Inter-marriage is relatively common and well accepted among both the refugees and the Tanzanians. Even when interviewees reported that no one in their family had intermarried, they were open to the idea.

The former Burundian refugees have learned to communicate effectively in Kiswahili, while the others continue to speak in their mother tongue Kirundi or Kiha.

Equality Between Former Refugees and Host Communities

Despite the high level of economic and social integration, the former Burundian refugees have not yet been legally integrated, even though they have been naturalized. They are not on equal footing as native Tanzanians, in that their freedom of movement and access to education and employment are limited, and they cannot vote in government elections or serve in the military. They do, however, participate in governance of the settlements, pay taxes and have access to most social services. Equality is more of an issue for the spontaneously settled, because they cannot be elected to village leadership positions and they report discrimination in terms of social services. They say that discrimination has decreased since they received identification slips.

Freedom of Movement. The Refugee Convention stipulates (and UNHCR encourages) freedom of movement. This generally means that once refugees are in their country of first asylum, they should be free to move around the country without limits. This is not the case in Tanzania, where refugees cannot leave the settlements without written authorization of the settlement commandant. While it is relatively easy to secure an exit permit, many avoid the formality because of the distance from their home to the commandant's office.

"We are not equal without freedom of movement."

- 1972 Burundian

Exit permits allow travel to anywhere in Tanzania and are valid up to 14 days, though approval is frequently sought for shorter periods. Even with a valid exit permit, refugees are expected to check in with immigration officials when they arrive at their destination and if they wish to request an extension for medical or education reasons.

There are no fences or other means to contain refugees in the settlements; many leave without exit passes. If stopped by an immigration officer, the punishment can be a fine and/or up to six months in prison. Some refugees have also reportedly been beaten by immigration officers after being stopped without an exit pass.

While spontaneously settled refugees do not need technically permission to travel outside their village, they feel safer carrying a document from their village chief introducing them to the chief of the village being visited.

Access to Services. Spontaneously settled refugees and refugees in settlements are assessed taxes similar to native Tanzanians and are allowed to receive basic social services. Unfortunately, their access is limited by the distance they must travel for those services and the fees associated with receiving them. Native Tanzanians in the area face these same challenges. The budgets for public infrastructure and social services, however, are disproportionately low in the settlements compared to the rest of the district where they are located. For example, the Mishamo settlement represents a little over half the population of the Mpanda district, but Mishamo has only a third of the district's primary schools, health centers, and dispensaries.

There are no standard fees for primary education, but parents must buy supplies and contribute to the cost of security. Public secondary schools cost TZS 20,000 (US \$12), and because of the distances many must travel, additional funds are needed to cover boarding costs. Fees for private secondary schools are higher (TZS 300,000+ or US \$180+) and also require resources to cover boarding costs. While fees pose a similar constraint for spontaneously settled refugees, the distance to travel for school is less of an issue.

Refugees receive services at health centers scattered throughout the settlements, but they are few and far between. It can take several hours by foot for some people to reach these services, but they are free if the family has purchased insurance, which costs TZS 5,000 (US \$3). Unfortunately, the level of care is low – none of the settlements have trained doctors, and it is often difficult to find the recommended medications.

Access to clean water, good roads, and communications are also issues faced by both refugees and members of the host communities, leaving them, overall, with a low standard of living.

Collaboration in Managing Settlements. Settlement oversight is the responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). In the case of the three Old Settlements, the MHA has appointed three Tanzanian settlement commandants to manage the settlements who are authorized to issue exit permits and coordinate with line ministries to provide social services.

Villages within the settlements have chairmen who are elected from among the refugees. Settlement leadership consists of other refugees in various positions. Spontaneously settled refugees are under the leadership of Tanzanian village chairmen and cannot run for election due to their citizenship status, which also precludes them from participating in village councils and committees.

Pathway to Citizenship. Virtually all the current issues related to the inequality between native Tanzanians and naturalized Tanzanians are tied to the fact that naturalized Tanzanians are not yet treated as citizens. This is an extremely sensitive topic for those interviewed in the settlements. It has been four years since they learned they were naturalized, but they have yet to receive certificates of citizenship. When asked if respondents had any questions, virtually all groups asked what was causing the delay, and whether the GOT planned to keep its commitment to give them

full citizenship. One group considered every question an opportunity to bring up the citizenship issue.

The Government of Tanzania started creating a pathway to citizenship in 2007. At that time, it expressed a desire to close the Old Settlements, which required a permanent solution for the approximately 218,000 Burundians housed there. The GOT invited UNHCR to re-establish a presence in the settlements and assist with a census and a registration study. These findings formed the basis of the Tanzania Comprehensive Solution Strategy (TANCOSS). The 56,600 people who indicated their preference to return to Burundi were repatriated between 2008 and 2010 (TANCOSS Pillar 1). Those who did not wish to repatriate applied for citizenship and the vast majority (162,256) were notified in April 2010 that they had been naturalized (TANCOSS Pillar 2). Naturalizing this number of people at one time is unprecedented and was set to serve as a model case worldwide for local integration.

“If we were forced to move, we would feel like refugees again. It would be like opening an old wound.”
- Elderly woman

In June 2010, the GOT issued more specific instructions regarding final integration (Pillar 3) of the NNTs. Instructions were laid out in the National Strategy for Community Integration Program (NaSCIP), and included the requirement for NNTs to relocate to 16 selected

regions and 52 districts across the country (the issue of relocation is further explored below in the section on Future Opportunities and Challenges).

By August 2011, relocation was put on hold, and remains on hold to this date. This has left NNTs in limbo regarding their status, as they were required to denounce their Burundian citizenship, but do not yet have documentation of their Tanzanian citizenship. They remain in the settlements with many of the responsibilities of citizenship, but with none of the rights.

Professor Bonaventure Rutinwa has provided a thorough analysis of their legal status in a paper written in February 2012, which is summarized below.

In absence of citizenship certificates, the NNTs could benefit from improved access to birth certificates. Births to NNTs are registered, and parents are given clinic cards for their newborns. They are then required to go to the district office to obtain a birth certificate. If they do this within a specified amount of time, the birth certificate is free.

Most refugees are unaware of the process, and distances to the district offices are great. Native Tanzanians face these same challenges, and often do not obtain birth certificates for their children. It is not clear if birth certificates have always been available to refugees, as some NNTs described the creative ways in which they obtained certificates so their children could receive certificates of completion from primary school and be admitted into secondary school. One interviewee told how she had Tanzanian friends “adopt” her children so that the children could attend secondary school.

“We are Tanzanians! Why are they asking us for a birth certificate all the time?” – A former refugee girl born in Tanzania

In 2010, UNHCR gave “photo slips” to the NNTs. These are simply pieces of paper with a copy of a photograph of each member of their household, along with their name, birthdate and other

identifying information. While they do not have the characteristics of a formal government ID, including the GOT emblem, they are the only form of ID held by NNTs who were born after their families arrived in 1972. (Those arriving in 1972 were given refugee IDs; the 1972 caseload in Kigoma still has them, but those going through the naturalization process were required to return them.)

The “former Burundian refugees in transition to citizenship,” as an UNHCR official refers to them, are very anxious to receive citizenship certificates and gain their full rights as Tanzanian citizens. When asked how their lives will be different once this happens, they offered these examples:

- Freedom of movement so they can travel or relocate as they wish
- The right to work without a work permit
- Admission to secondary schools and universities
- The ability to vote and participate in the democratic process
- Access to credit through banks/savings and loan associations
- Participation in cooperatives that provide access to fertilizers
- The opportunity to obtain titles for their houses and land

Host Government and Host Community Welcoming

The government and citizens of Tanzania welcomed Burundian refugees when they first arrived in 1972, and again when a second wave arrived in 1993. At one point, Tanzania hosted more than 610,000 Burundian refugees. Most of the 1993 caseload repatriated, as did many from the 1972 caseload, but Tanzania still hosts nearly 200,000 Burundians in camps, settlements, and villages in the western part of the country.

The national government’s tone and level of support was set by the first president, Julius Nyerere, a firm believer in Pan-Africanism. This ideology encourages solidarity among Africans worldwide and holds that this unity makes African states and people more powerful and self-reliant ([Milner 2013:6](#)). His influence continued for many years, but attitudes and policies changed in the mid-1990s after a massive influx of refugees from Tanzania, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The national government continues to provide a welcoming environment to refugees who have remained in Tanzania since 1972.

“Tanzania is like our mother – she took care of us and taught us how to live.” – *Elderly woman*

Host Government Refugee Policies. The foundation was laid for Tanzania’s approach to refugees in the early 1960s. Tanzania’s experience gaining independence was peaceful, so it was seen as a stable country for refugees from countries like Burundi and Rwanda that were experiencing political upheaval and violence. President Nyerere, who served from 1961-1985, established a welcoming environment for refugees based on his support of Pan-Africanism. He also supported the creation of the 1964 Tripartite model with UNHCR, the Government of Tanzania and the NGO Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) that agreed on the following principles and activities to manage the influx of refugees from Burundi and Rwanda:

1. The Tanzanian government would provide five hectares of land and farming tools, access to all social services (health care, education, etc.), and an import duty tax waiver for materials intended for refugee settlement areas.
2. TCRS was responsible for managing the settlements and the refugees' particular needs and facilitating their access to government services.
3. UNHCR was responsible for funding the programs and advising on technical and refugee rights issues ([Milner 2013:5](#)).

The Burundians who arrived in 1972 benefited greatly from the tripartite model of refugee settlements. From the 1960s through the 1980s, refugees entering and settling in Tanzania were welcomed and accepted, as evidenced by the 1980 decision to naturalize more than 36,000 Rwandan refugees.

The 1990s to mid-2000s witnessed a drastic change in Tanzania's refugee policy resulting from renewed conflicts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) and genocide in Rwanda, which caused large influxes of refugees. The changing political environment in Tanzania also played a critical role. Hundreds of thousands of refugees flowed into Tanzania over a short period of time from 1993–1995. Feeling pressure from the more than half-million refugees who sought protection, Tanzania shut its border with Burundi in an attempt to stop the flow of refugees from Burundi and Rwanda. In December 1996, Tanzania mandated – and often forced – more than 480,000 Rwandan refugees to return to their home country. These actions marked the end of Tanzania's open door policy concerning refugees. In addition, the Tanzanian government decided that refugees who arrived in the 1990s must be housed in refugee camps and not co-mingled or settled among Tanzanian communities. This decision was made under the auspices of safety and security for all Tanzanians. There was an excessive fear that refugee areas were harboring “genocidaires” and other violent and/or criminal elements. Further, the large influx of refugees was taking its toll on the environment; water and forestry resources were being depleted. The GOT also believed that the international community was not providing enough financial support for the number of refugees and the environmental and infrastructural damage they inflicted on the country. Consequently, in 1998, Tanzania enacted a restrictive new refugee law that emphasized the following:

- The government would no longer allow massive influxes of refugees
- Refugees' freedom of movement would be restricted to traveling within four kilometers of their camp
- Refugees would be prohibited from seeking wage earning jobs and establishing economic livelihoods among host communities ([Milner 2013:7](#)) and IRC response to mini-survey)

By 2003, the above practices were codified in the new National Refugee Policy that also dismissed granting citizenship as a durable solution and identified repatriation as the best one for refugees in Tanzania ([Milner 2013:10](#)). As one observer put it, “Tanzania's initial refugee policies have in effect reversed themselves over the last 40 years, from one of unconditional hospitality to discouragement and persistent repatriation” ([Ongpin 2008:15](#)).

When fragile stability returned to Burundi, more than 500,000 Burundian refugees, including many living in Tanzania, returned to their home country between 2002 and 2009.

In late 2007, Tanzania began to search for a durable solution for refugees that remained within their borders. Political campaigns and rhetoric began clamoring for a “refugee-free” Tanzania. UNHCR and the governments of Tanzania and Burundi formed a Tripartite Commission to work together to find a permanent solution for Burundian refugees in Tanzania, including the 1993 and 1972 caseloads. These events led to a re-examination of the status of the 1972 Burundian refugee population that was the basis of the 2008 Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy (TANCOSS), which included three pillars:

1. *Voluntary Repatriation*: Repatriate the 1972 Burundian refugees who expressed the desire to return to Burundi, along with those from the 1993 caseload. Approximately 46,000 of the 220,000 1972 Burundians were repatriated by October 2009.
2. *Naturalization*: Process the naturalization of the 1972 Burundians who expressed the desire to remain in Tanzania (the 1990s Burundian and Rwandan caseloads were not included in the naturalization offer). In April 2010, the GOT announced that 162,256 Burundians had been naturalized. There is still a pending residual caseload of those who missed the deadline, those whose cases were rejected, all babies born after 2010, and those who spontaneously settled.
3. *Relocation*: Naturalization of the 1972 Burundian refugees came with the condition that they would receive citizenship certificates after they moved to a location outside the current settlements. Plan details were outlined in the National Strategy for Community Integration Program (NaSCIP) announced in June 2010. This pillar has yet to be implemented.

Relocation efforts were put on hold by the GOT in August 2011. It is difficult to piece together the full picture of why the decision was made without having access to those who made it, but the most common understanding is that there was resistance in the regions slated to receive the relocated former Burundians refugees. Some suggest that regional leaders were not sufficiently consulted during the process, while others suggest that officials were not pleased with the level of support they were going to receive for hosting the new citizens, or that they feared the former refugees would bring violence to their villages. Another complicating factor was that during the period when decisions were made about moving the new citizens out of Katumba and Mishamo, the GOT was also in discussions with Agrisol, a large US agricultural company, regarding a large-scale agricultural project in the settlement areas. Some believe that the opportunity for this sort of investment in Tanzania had an impact on relocation decisions. Whatever the actual reason, the final directive regarding relocation and practicing their citizenship remains on hold.

While the decision is pending, NNTs remain in settlements and are mostly treated as refugees, despite their lack of refugee status. The level of support varies among the regions that host them (Katavi, Tabora, and Kigoma) and among the district governments that provide services to them. The level of support of the regional commissioners and the district executive committees, however, does not appear to be tied.

There are also radical differences among the commandants of the three Old Settlements, each of whom were interviewed by the evaluation team. They set the tone for the settlement, and their attitudes range from seeing the 1972 Burundians as a burden and nuisance – thus feeling the need to control them – to the other extreme of seeing them as people who have been put in a bad situation

but who can contribute to their communities if allowed to do so. It is not surprising, then, that there is a correlation between the attitude of the commandant and the percentage of Burundians who chose to remain in Tanzania when given the option to repatriate: the more refugee-friendly the settlement, the less likely the refugees were to repatriate.

Meetings for the evaluation team were confirmed with the relevant regional and district commissioners, but only one took place as planned, which is an important finding in itself. This made it challenging to gain a full understanding of the attitudes of government officials toward the refugees. Findings from other sources, nevertheless, reveal factors – or what should be factors – about having refugees within their domain:

- **Population** – With well over 120,000 refugees in the Katavi region, 50,000 in Tabora, and 25,000 in Kigoma, the refugees make up a significant portion of the population in these three regions. (These numbers are rounded and assume there have been many births since the last census.) In fact, the number of refugees in Katavi is so great that it justified splitting it off from the Rukwa region. In other words, if the two settlements in Katavi were closed, there may no longer be sufficient population to justify have it as a separate region.
- **Taxes** – Although the naturalized former Burundians do not yet benefit from any of the rights of citizenship, they bear some obligations of citizens, like paying taxes. This is particularly significant in the case of those who grow tobacco and other cash crops that are taxed. Unfortunately, data about tax revenues is not easily disaggregated by citizenship status, so cannot be quantified.
- **Food supply** – The former Burundian refugees are known to be hard-working, productive farmers who contribute to the food supply in the regions where they live, particularly the supply of cassava.
- **Land use** – As discussed above, the case of Agrisol illustrates at least one opportunity that Tanzania has had to use settlements for other purposes. Similarly, some have suggested that it is time to return Ilyankulu to its former use as a forest reserve, although the feasibility and likelihood of that is questionable.
- **Safety** – There is a perception that the former Burundian refugees are prone to banditry, other crimes, and bringing weapons in from Burundi, affecting regional safety and security. However, no data were available to substantiate this claim or claims that crime levels were any higher in or around the settlements compared to other villages in Tanzania.

Local Population's Acceptance of Refugees. On the surface, at least, there seems to be a strong correlation between the attitude of the commandant and the host communities toward the refugees: in the two settlements where the commandant is welcoming and positive, the host community also has warm feelings toward the refugees. Refugees feel most welcome with commandants who do not draw clear lines between refugees and host community, allowing more flexibility in terms of freedom of movement and access to government services, land, agricultural inputs, and credit.

In part, the local population's acceptance of the Burundians is related to their general attitude toward people in need: you help your brother; these people were forced from their country and need a home. It is also related, however, to the fact that Burundians have contributed to the development of the area. The significant size of their population stimulates the economy by adding a large number of people to increase demand and supply and, in turn, increase tax revenues.

Likewise, their presence has helped contribute to the development of the area by attracting donor funding for schools, clinics, and other services.

“They need to be Tanzanians, and we need them to be Tanzanians, we cooperate and we work together, and it is peaceful - it will be better for them to be free and mix more with Tanzanians.” – *Middle-aged Tanzania man*

The level of acceptance of the 1972 Burundians is also related to their own attitudes and behavior. When they arrived, they did not have a lot in common with their Tanzanian hosts, yet they quickly assimilated and now live in peace and harmony in their new country. They are respectful

of the laws and cultural practices of their hosts. They are grateful to be living in a peaceful land and do not take that blessing for granted.

Diplomatic and Programmatic Interventions

Finally, diplomatic and programmatic support are factors in the successful local integration of refugees. In the case of the 1972 Burundians, UNHCR provided programmatic support through 1985 when the refugees were fully established and no longer needed their assistance. Donors and implementing partners contributed to these efforts. When UNHCR was invited back by the GOT in 2007, additional assistance was provided, but on a much smaller scale. UNHCR also leads teams of diplomatic interventions with support from governments like the U.S., many European countries, and Japan.

Diplomatic Support. Documentation regarding the nature and extent of diplomatic support is not easily accessible and, with relatively frequent staff rotations in UNHCR and donor governments, there is little institutional memory of the support given over the years.

UNCHR has facilitated a number of tripartite meetings and agreements between the governments of Tanzania and Burundi over the years, including the following:

- August 1991 agreement to establish a working group on the promotion of durable solutions
- March 1998 agreement for UNHCR to facilitate voluntary repatriation
- May 2001 agreement on voluntary repatriation of Burundian refugees in Tanzania
- April 2002 agreement on the voluntary repatriation of Burundians
- 2007 agreement to handle the 1972 caseload
- May 2011 agreement to close Mtabila camp by December 31, 2011 (subsequent agreement extended the deadline to December 21, 2012)
- 2013 continuation of Technical Working Groups of the Tripartite Commission on the situation of Burundian Refugees living in Tanzania

In addition, UNHCR hosts familiarization missions to help donor governments and stakeholders get a better sense of the situation in the settlements. The issues surrounding the 1972 Burundians are also raised at UNHCR executive committee and annual meetings in New York.

The donor community has also engaged through diplomatic means. The most recent high-level intervention occurred on September 30, 2013, when a letter was sent to President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete congratulating the government for granting citizenship to 162,000 former Burundian

refugees and setting an example for other countries. In the same communication, the donor community stressed the importance of promptly resolving questions regarding NNTs and asked “that they be issued appropriate documentation confirming their legal status.” As of June 2014, President Kikwete has not acknowledged this communication; there has been no formal follow-up.

Programmatic Support. Over the past 15 years, UNHCR had the following budget, offices, and staff. Also indicated on the table are the numbers of people assisted by UNHCR, which includes all refugees, persons of concern, and asylum seekers of all nationalities.

Year	Budget (USD in millions)	Offices/Staff	Persons of Concern (all nationalities)	Persons of Concern Served by UNHCR (all nationalities)
2000	33.5	6/206	700,400	530,400
2001	30.5	6/191	689,500	518,490
2002	28.9	6/Not reported	687,570	517,570
2003	28.8	Not reported	649,900	479,700
2004	30.6	Not reported	602,200	404,000
2005	31.6	6/167	549,400	350,400
2006	35.7	6/164	485,600	287,400
2007	33.9	6/243	436,000	217,700
2008	41.9	Not reported	322,160	322,160
2009	50.4	3/183	274,650	274,650
2010	28.8	Not reported	272,910	272,910
2011	23.8	9/178	294,160	271,200
2012	21.5	9/176	263,810	241,400
2013	20.0	9/138	264,300	242,610

*Source: UNHCR Global Reports 2000-2013

The main purpose of UNHCR’s presence in the three settlements is to provide “capacity support to the Ministry of Home Affairs on legal and administrative issues, the district council, local communities, and the police. UNHCR has also implemented 45 medium to small-scale community-based projects targeting populations of concern in the settlements, as well as the surrounding communities, in order to safeguard access to basic social services in the health, water and education sectors” (UNHCR Fact Sheet April 2014).

Examples of local integration interventions funded through donors like Belgium, the European Community, Germany, and Japan includes:

- Rehabilitating government structures like registration centers, MOHA buildings, and guesthouses
- Rehabilitating and upgrading transport infrastructure
- Developing water systems
- Constructing tree seed nurseries to help rehabilitate settlement areas
- Rehabilitating and extending existing health facilities

Other interventions are being considered. From April-July 2014, a World Bank and UNHCR mission was conducted to “analyze the extent, causes, and character of forced displacement in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa in order to provide the World Bank and UNHCR, client governments and other development actors in the GLR with information on (i) the development needs of the displaced, (ii) other opportunities for development interventions in support of the displaced, and (iii) recommendations for the design of displacement sensitive policy and operational activities.” More specifically, the study will inform the design of a US \$100 million project for “Improving Resilience and Social Cohesion in Border Communities” in Tanzania, DRC, and Zambia.

B. FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

Settling the issue of relocation and providing NNTs with their certificates of citizenship are the main challenges at hand. This will allow them to start enjoying the benefits of citizenship, like having access to credit, fertilizer, employment, and greater educational opportunities, as well as freedom of movement and participation in the political process.

The team believes there are many reasons not to pursue forced relocation, including the following:

1. It is inconsistent with the right to freedom of movement granted to Tanzanian citizens.
2. It is contrary to the preferences of the former Burundian refugees.
3. Forced relocation would make the former refugees feel like they were displaced again. They will need to restart process of social integration and would carry the refugee stigma with them to their new regions.
4. It disrupts their livelihoods and jeopardizes their self-reliance (leaving their farms and homes), recreates poverty and dependency on external assistance.
5. It is costly to compensate NNTs for their land and permanent crops. They will also need resources for new homes, as well as buying, clearing, and cultivating new land;
6. It is costly and complicated to move 200,000+ people. Agricultural and education concerns would need to be factored when determining timing.
7. Hosting communities would lose food crops and tax revenues.
8. Newly formed region and districts would lose populations.
9. There is insufficient support among potential new host districts and regions.
10. Additional resource would be needed to help new hosts; if a large number relocated to small number of areas, there is concern they could form an enclave. If they dispersed to many areas, however, it would not be cost-effective to provide support to new hosts.
11. Obtaining the required funding from the international community would be a challenge.
12. A solid plan for operational support and coordination is needed.

Given these complications, there is not a clear or easy answer. In his February 2012 report (pages 68-74), Professor Bonaventure Rutinwa identifies three possible ways forward, which are summarized from his paper as follows:

- *Reverse the granting of citizenship and give permanent residence* – This is not a likely solution, given that it would require rescinding a decision by the president, which would “significantly undermine confidence in statements of the Tanzania Government in the

international community.” It could also result in “costly and embarrassing legal challenges.” Ultimately, however, it simply postpones citizenship, because permanent residents have the right to apply for citizenship once certain conditions are met.

- *Allow NNTs to remain in the settlements* – This is the “most preferred option” among the former Burundian refugees. It would, however, require addressing the reasons the GOT had for pursuing relocation in the first place:
 - “The need to ensure full integration of the NNTs in the wider Tanzanian community so that they can shed the stigma of refugeehood” (this can be achieved by “allowing free in and out migration of native citizens” and encouraging indigenous Tanzanians to co-locate with new Tanzanians)
 - “The need to avoid creating Burundi enclaves in Tanzania which could undermine national security” (authors’ note: data not available to support that this is a security threat)
 - “The need to return the settlements to the legal status as forest reserves” (no longer a strong reason, given that the GOT already demonstrated its willingness to consider “changing the use of the areas from forest reserve to other economic uses” when signing a memorandum of understanding with Agrisol)
- *Relocate under a re-conceptualized local integration program* – Relocation remains a viable idea, but would require incorporating some key principles as outlined by Professor Rutinwa:
 - Freedom to move to a place of their choice
 - Self-driven in terms of timing and process
 - Flexible timeline
 - Compensation for assets and loss of earning capacity

CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

The GOT was initially very welcoming and helpful to Burundian refugees that fled to Tanzania starting in 1972. Its openness and generosity enabled them to realize a relatively high level of social and economic integration; the GOT provided land and access to services to the 1972 Burundians, which allowed the refugees to achieve self-reliance and a standard of living similar to that of Tanzanians living in the surrounding area. The host communities' welcoming attitude also allowed the 1972 Burundians to integrate socially and feel that Tanzania is their home, as well as a place where they could enjoy peace and security.

The GOT attempted to legally integrate the 1972 Burundians when it offered to naturalize all those who chose not to repatriate. Having naturalized over 162,000 former Burundian refugees in 2010, the GOT was lauded internationally for this unprecedented move.

Shortly after they received verbal notification of their naturalization, the NNTs were told they would have to relocate to another part of Tanzania before they could receive their certificate of citizenship. A year later, the relocation plan was put on hold when it was concluded that the GOT did not have the support of the regions that were to host the former Burundian refugees.

Where there was once hope that they would be legally integrated, there is now frustration, disappointment, and confusion amongst NNTs regarding their legal status. In the process of being naturalized, they denounced their Burundian citizenship, so they are no longer Burundians. And because they are naturalized Tanzanians, they are no longer refugees. Because they are not allowed to practice their rights as naturalized citizens, however, they are not yet treated as legal Tanzanians. This has left them confused about their identity and uncertain about their future. At this point, they still feel that UNHCR and GOT will make things right, but the level of frustration will increase over time.

The NNTs have also experienced economic setbacks. When they were informed about the relocation plans, they were told not to build permanent structures or plant long-term crops, so their sense of security and their productivity decreased. At the same time, the level of services decreased, because district officials were told to limit investments, as the settlements were to close when the 1972 Burundians relocated to other parts of Tanzania. This decrease in public services included closing secondary schools in the settlements.

The relocation issue is still unresolved, with no obvious conclusion in the near future. With campaigning already underway for the 2015 presidential election, the attention of elected officials is diverted – this is not a priority for them. The issue also has the potential to be controversial, further reducing the political will to resolve it once and for all.

Given that the 1972 Burundians are not a priority for the GOT at this time, it is the responsibility of UNHCR and partner governments to pressure the GOT to address the issue. Absent external pressure, resolution will most likely be delayed through the election. There is a real risk that if the issue is not resolved before the current president – the one who made the commitment to naturalize these refugees – leaves office in 2015, the new president may not take ownership. A six-month delay may lead to an indefinite one as a result of the elections, and the 1972 Burundians will continue living in limbo without practicing or accessing their rights as Tanzanian citizens (or Burundian citizens), or having the assistance and protection that refugees normally receive.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

While there are some programmatic recommendations, the overarching issue is citizenship. If this issue is not resolved, programmatic efforts will not succeed, either. Following are programmatic and diplomatic recommendations for both the USG and UNHCR.

Programmatic Interventions

1. UNHCR and partner governments should fund NGOs to provide village-based credit programs, agricultural training, community health education, water well maintenance, etc.
2. The GOT and NGOs should facilitate community-driven reconstruction within the villages. The GOT and UNHCR should consider how to approach the challenges of governance in the settlements, given that refugees have come to rely on UNHCR since their return in 2007. There must be a clear transition away from UNHCR. The population must not look to UNHCR for protection or services but rather to the GOT, civil society organizations, and/or traditional leadership. It is worth considering the community-driven development approach that was pioneered by the World Bank, USAID, and others, and subsequently adapted by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) for post-conflict situations (see Attachment C for IRC's manual on community-driven reconstruction).
3. UNHCR, in collaboration with the GOT and national NGOs, should provide civic education for both new and old Tanzanian citizens so they understand their rights and responsibilities.
4. NGOs should offer legal aid related to land issues, birth certificates, and social services.

Diplomatic Interventions

1. UNHCR and partner governments should increase pressure on the president of Tanzania and other relevant parts of the GOT to resolve the relocation issue before the 2015 presidential elections. This should include the following:
 - a. Highlight how the status quo is hindering the progress of the 1972 Burundians, as well as development of the regions where the settlements are located.
 - b. Build and maintain a sense of urgency. If this is not resolved before a new president is elected, the issue may remain unresolved indefinitely, which denies the 1972 Burundians the ability to exercise their rights as citizens of Tanzania. This also puts a “black mark” on an initiative for which the GOT was so recently widely applauded.
 - c. Follow up with the president, prime minister, and parliament on every GOT event, speech, or news article that mentions the issue.

- d. Orient new officials from the GOT and international community to help make this a priority issue and to minimize the chances that it will drop off their agendas.
 - e. Stay focused amid competing priorities like the presidential elections, current review of the constitution, etc. There are opportunities to keep the Burundian caseload in focus as the GOT reviews the immigration and refugee rights components of the constitution.
- 2. Promote a solution that includes the following components:
 - a. Grant citizenship certificates without the requirement to relocate.
 - b. Support voluntary relocation – in terms of when and where 1972 Burundians will relocate – to reduce pressure on the regions that currently host the former refugees. This should include both policy and financial support.
 - c. Classify the settlement villages as regular villages in the districts.
 - d. Encourage native Tanzanians to move to the settlement areas to increase social integration and reduce concern about an enclave forming. This may require an incentive, such as offering a plot of land for cultivating along with agricultural inputs.
 - e. Allow the NNTs to practice their full rights as citizens, including, but not limited to, freedom of movement, the right to work, access to credit, membership in cooperatives, greater access to secondary schools and universities, and the right to vote.
 - f. Solicit financial support from development donors for relocation purposes and to help districts that host more new citizens than they can reasonably absorb. It is advisable that the GOT conduct a survey in collaboration with UNHCR to understand the possible impact on various regions and districts.
- 3. Urge the GOT to initiate the naturalization process for Burundians who spontaneously settled in the Kigoma region.
- 4. Encourage the GOT to allow district governments to fund development activities in the settlements on par with other administrative units in their districts.

Recommendations for Other Countries Considering Local Integration

A number of lessons learned from Tanzania can benefit other governments as they approach local integration. Host governments should:

- 1. Include all pertinent levels of government – village, district, regional – in key decision making processes regarding durable solutions.
- 2. Confirm all agreements in writing, to the extent practical, to help minimize chances that decisions will be rescinded or delayed.
- 3. Comply with the Refugee Convention by allowing freedom of movement to maximize benefits to households and local economies. This might include eliminating the requirement for an exit pass to leave a settlement and working with UNHCR to educate police and immigration officials about the rights of refugees.
- 4. Consider the possibility of a protracted situation and associated potential environmental impacts when designating refugee settlements or camps. This might include monitoring and addressing deforestation and promoting farming techniques that ensure continued fertility of farm land.

5. Allow nationals to live in settlements to promote social integration and decrease the chance of an enclave forming.
6. In collaboration with UNHCR and UNDP, include settlements as part of district and regional development plans; provide infrastructure in settlements on par with local communities. For example, the local court system is accessible and functioning since it is placed in the refugee settlement of Mishamo.
7. Use current government structures to manage local integration processes, rather than create new ones.
8. Implement, in collaboration with UNHCR, a consistent and regular communication plan to help keep refugees/former refugees informed and to contain rumors among refugees, host communities, and government officials.
9. Provide refugees with host government identification documents through any transitional phase to lessen frustration and uncertainty about legal status.
10. Cooperate with UNHCR and the international community to secure continuous advocacy and financial and administrative support to see the naturalization process through to conclusion. This should include increased dialogue and documentation so the process is transparent and there is consensus among key actors, agreement regarding the amount of funding required, and clarification about donor conditions for funding. Empower a government official, most likely within the ministry responsible for refugees, to build and maintain momentum so that the naturalization process continues through changes in personnel, priorities, or policy.

ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT A: List of People Interviewed

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Government of the Republic of Tanzania

Dar es Salaam

1. Harrison Mseke, Director, Refugee Service Department, Ministry of Home Affairs
2. Paul Mselle, Immigration Department (not available at scheduled time)
3. Prime Minister's Office – Regional Administrative and Local Government (PMO-RALG) (not available at scheduled time)

Katavi Region

4. Dr. Rajab Rutengwe, Regional Commission (not available at scheduled time) – Lauteri Kanoni, Assistant Administrative Secretary for Local Government covered

Mpanda District, Mishamo Settlement

5. Mr. Mwamlima, District Commissioner (not available at scheduled time)
6. Mr. Changha, District Executive Director (DED) (not available at scheduled time) – 14 members of the District Council participated in group interview
7. Fred Nsajile, Settlement Commandant

Nsimbo/Mlele District, Katumba Settlement

8. Col. Ngemera Lubinga, District Commissioner (not available at scheduled time)
9. Neneke Rasid, DED (not available at scheduled time) – 5 members of the District Council participated in a group interview
10. Othman Igwe, Settlement Commandant

Tabora Region, Kaliua District, Ilyankulu Settlement

11. Hon. Fatuma Gwasa, Regional Commissioner
12. Mr. Maketa, District Commissioner (not available at scheduled time)
13. Mr. Abdallah, DED (not available at scheduled time) – 16 members of the District Council participated in a group interview
14. Abdul Kareem Mnacho, Settlement Commandant

Kigoma Region (Self-Settlement Area)

15. Tony Laizer, MHA Zonal Coordinator (not available at scheduled time)
16. Hon. Lt Col. (Rtd) Issa Machibya, Regional Commissioner (not available at scheduled time) – Consult. Eng. Dr. John S. Ndunguru, Regional Administrative Secretary covered

United Nations and Other International Organizations

17. Joyce Mends-Cole, Resident Coordinator
18. Robert Tibagwa, Deputy Representative, Dar es Salaam
19. Mark Kirya, Senior Programme Officer, Dar es Salaam
20. Linmei Li, Senior Protection Officer, Dar es Salaam
21. Stephan Mhando, Public Information Officer, Dar es Salaam
22. Matilda Svensson, Associate Donor Relations Officer, Dar es Salaam
23. Nicolas Gichumbi, Associate Protection Officer, Dar es Salaam
24. Godlove Kifikilo, Associate Protection Officer, Dar es Salaam
25. Mulugeta Zewdie, Head of Field Office, Mpanda
26. Godasto Mudima, Program Associate, Mpanda
27. Boniface Bendakeha, Protection Associate, Mpanda
28. Lilian Mrema, Senior Field Assistant, Mpanda
29. Adolph Bishanga, Head of Field Unit, Mishamo
30. Moses Kajora, Protection Officer, Mishamo
31. Agnes Kanyonyi, Head of Field Unit, Ilyankuli
32. Sabina Luoga, Protection Associate, Kigoma

Partner Governments

33. Elizabeth Pelletreau, U.S. Embassy
34. Sherry C. Sewall, U.S. Embassy
35. Danny Dedeyan, USAID
36. Holger Pifinsten, German Embassy
37. Fabrizio Moroni, European Union

Non-Governmental Organizations / Implementing Partners for Local Integration

38. Brahim Johnson, Centre for the Study of Forced Migration
39. Izengo Leonard Kulwa, Administrator, Tanganyika Christian Refugee Services (TCRS)
40. Albert Temu, Program Officer, Tanganyika Christian Refugee Services (TCRS)
41. Mr. Kasaizi, Executive Director, REDESO
42. Elijah Okeyo, Country Director, International Rescue Committee (IRC)

Others

43. Augustino Kalinga, Tabora Municipal Director and Former NaSCIP Coordinator
44. Professor Bonaventure Rutinwa, Director, Center for the Study of Forced Migration, University of Dar es Salaam School of Law

Former Burundian Refugees and Tanzanian Host Community

Interview Type	Gender	Age Group	Government Settlement vs Self-Settled
Focus Group – Burundians	106 Males 53% 95 Females 47%	<18 4% 18-29 24% 30-50 35% >50 37%	GS 97% SS 3%
In-depth One-on-One – Burundians	13 Males 65% 7 Females 35%	<18 0% 18-29 15% 30-50 45% >50 40%	GS 60% SS 40%
Focus Groups – Tanzanian Host Community	33 Males 75% 11 Females 25%	<18 0% 18-29 12% 30-50 45% >50 43%	n/a
TOTAL	152 Males 113 Females 265 TOTAL	<18 3% 18-29 21% 30-50 38% >50 38%	GS 77% SS 33%

ATTACHMENT B: List of Documents Consulted

- Ager, Alastair and Alison Strang. "Indicators of Integration." 2004.
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- Crisp, Jeff. "The Local Integration and Local Settlement of Refugees: A Conceptual Framework and Historical Analysis." UNHCR Working Paper No. 102. Apr 2004.
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- Milner, James. "Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Understanding the Shifting Politics of Refugee Policy in Tanzania." UNHCR Research Paper 255. July 2013.
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<http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR33/37-38.pdf>
- Rutinwa, Bonaventure. "Review of the Local Integration Programme for the Former 1972 Burundian Refugees in Tanzania.
- UNHCR. "Tanzania Operation Fact Sheet." April 2014.
- UNHCR. Durable Solutions.
<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c101.html>
- UNHCR. "Information Note." 2012.
<http://www.unhcr.org/50a5ff63c.pdf>
- UNHCR. Consolidated inter-agency information note on the closure of the Mtabila camp in the United Republic of Tanzania and return to Burundi of the former refugees. 15 October 2012 – 31 March 2013. (2012) <http://www.unhcr.org/50a5ff63c.pdf>
- UNHCR. "Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees." 1951
<http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf>

ATTACHMENT C: Community-Driven Reconstruction

Please see attached Document submitted with final report.